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In the 1990s, competition among health insurance funds (‘sickness funds’) was introduced in 
Germany. As one means of competition, free choice of initial health funds and subsequent 
switching between them was made available to all insured. Since then, the number of funds 
has decreased substantially, and funds have had to engage in competitive strategies to remain 
in the market. In this paper, we want to analyse the funds’ advertising activities in the face of 
the changed competitive environment. This has not been possible to date due to a lack of data. 
We use two new datasets to get a first insight into the potential effects of competition on 
funds’ advertising strategies; one of the volume and cost of advertisements and one of their 
contents. 
Our results suggest that competition has been associated with an increase in the amount of 
advertising. As to the adverts themselves, we find that there was a decrease in the share of 
advertisements of a ‘general’ content in favour of advertisements of a more ‘fund-specific’ 
content. The data therefore indicate that once the market was open to switching of funds by 
the insured, funds’ advertising efforts changed to differentiating their own perceived strengths 
from  those  of  competitor  funds.  These  observations  allow  us  to  draw  some  tentative 
conclusions  about  the  relevance  of  (attempts  of)  risk  selection  by  health  funds  via 
advertisements and about the general success of the pro-competitive legislation. 
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 1. Introduction 
The demographic evolution, in particular rising life-expectancies, as well as the technological 
progress in the health sector are largely seen as the main causes of the increase in health 
expenditures during the last decades. As a reaction to these developments, a number of pro-
competition reforms were introduced in the German health sector in the 1990s to increase 
cost-efficiency and thus alleviate the financial pressure on the health system.
1 For the public 
health  insurance  funds  (‘sickness  funds’),  major  changes  followed  from  the  Health  Care 
Structure  Act  (Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz)  passed  in  1992,  which  extended  free  choice  of 
health fund to everyone from 1996 onwards, while free choice had previously been restricted 
to only a small group of insured. Since the passing of this law, the number of health funds has 
decreased substantially, and funds have had to engage in competitive strategies to remain in 
the market. One such strategy is advertising.
2 
In a regulated competitive market such as the German health sector, advertising may also be 
used by the funds as one means of indirect risk selection: Instead of reducing costs through 
increasing efficiency, funds may opt to reduce costs through selective enrolment or ‘cream-
skimming’  of  low-risk  individuals.  As  Van  de  Ven  and  Van  Vliet  (1992,  42)  point  out, 
“solving  the  problem  of  cream-skimming  is  a  necessary  condition  for  a  successful 
implementation of a wide range of market oriented strategies in health care, which are being 
discussed  these  days  in  so  many  countries”.  While  direct  risk  selection  in  Germany  is 
prohibited by law, there is anecdotal evidence that health insurance funds engage in indirect 
risk selection. Advertising in the German health insurance market may therefore have two 
faces: First, to simply remain in the market, and second, to increase the share of low-risk 
members. 
In  this  paper,  we  analyse  the  funds’  advertising  activities  in  the  changed  competitive 
environment. This has  not been possible to date due to a lack of data. We use two new 
datasets to get a first insight into the potential effects of these changes, one of the volume and 
cost of all advertisements placed by the main German health funds in all German newspapers 
and magazines, and one of the contents of the advertisements placed in the most advertising-
intensive magazine Stern.  
Our results suggest that competition has been associated with an increase in the amount of 
advertising by German health insurance funds. In addition, we find that the introduction of 
                                                            
1 For a discussion of the different reforms, see, e.g., Busse and Riesberg (2004).  
2 Advertising strategies have been analysed in other contexts, e.g. financial markets (e.g. Cronqvist, 2005; Jain 
and Wu, 2000; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) and the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Avery et al., 2008, for a   3
competition has been associated with a decrease in the share of advertisements of a ‘general’ 
content  in  favour  of  advertisements  of  a  more  ‘fund-specific’  content.  The  data  therefore 
indicate  that  once  the  market  was  open  to  switching  of  funds  by  the  insured,  funds’ 
advertising  efforts  changed  to  differentiating  their  own  perceived  strengths  from  those  of 
competitor funds. 
In this paper, we analyse this not yet studied but relevant topic by way of using the new 
datasets to examine the associations in the data from which we elicit and discuss the research 
questions  that  we  subject  to  econometric  scrutiny  in  our  current  research  (Becker  and 
Uebelmesser, 2010, and Becker, Hole and Uebelmesser, 2010). The paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides some background information about the German health funds 
sector. Section 3 presents the quantitative and qualitative data and examines the associations 
between the introduction of the competitive measures and the advertising activities. Section 4 
evaluates the potential of risk selection by health funds in Germany and relates this to the 
observed advertising activities. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background   
Regulation of health insurance in Germany dates back to 1883 when the first Health Insurance 
Act was implemented. In 2007, about 88% of the German population were insured with a so-
called ‘public’ health insurance fund with contribution rates related to wage income but not to 
individual risk. These insured include mostly employees, students, pensioners, unemployed 
and those not insured on their own but as a family member, for example children.
3,4  
Initially, not everyone was eligible to join all health insurance funds. By the end of the 1980s, 
only about 60% of the insured had some choice (Buchner and Wasem, 2003). In general, 
everyone had access to the regional, or basic, funds (Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse AOK). 
However, employees whose employing company or guild had founded a fund were confined 
to  joining  this  company  fund  (Betriebskrankenkasse  BKK)  or  guild  fund 
(Innungskrankenkasse  IKK).  The  so-called  substitute  funds  were  available  for  blue-collar 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
study on direct-to-consumer advertising, and more generally Scherer, 2000; Schweitzer, 2007), but not yet in the 
context of health insurance markets. 
3 Of those who are not insured with a ‘public’ health insurance fund, 80% are insured with a private insurance. 
These are mostly the self-employed, civil servants, and employees with an income above a threshold level (€ 
48.600 in 2009). In contrast to public funds, the private funds’ premia are related to individual risks but not to 
wage income. In this paper, we consider public health insurance funds only. 
4 In legal terms, there is a distinction between contributing members and so-called family members, i.e. those not 
insured in their own right but through an insured member of the family. In addition, contributing members can 
be obligatory or voluntary members depending on whether their wage income falls short or exceeds the threshold 
level which allows them to choose a private fund (cf. Footnote 3). We refer here to the different groups together 
as insured or members.    4
workers (Ersatzkasse für Arbeiter EAR) as well as for white-collar workers (Ersatzkasse für 
Angestellte EAN), where ‘substitute’ refers to the fact that membership of these funds was a 
substitute for membership of the AOK, BKK and IKK.
  
The regional insurance funds faced higher average risk portfolios compared with the BKK, 
IKK  and the substitute  funds as the share of low-income insured,  for  example social aid 
recipients,  unemployed  and  pensioners,  was  relatively  high.
  5  As  the  higher  cost,  which 
followed, required the regional funds to charge higher contribution rates, the risk structure as 
well as the contribution rates differed widely across funds. Furthermore, many of their insured 
had little or no possibility to switch to a fund with a lower contribution rate.  
This inequality was considered ‘unfair’, and as a consequence, the German health sector saw 
a  number  of  pro-competition  reform  measures  in  the  1990s.  Beside  increasing  (cost-) 
efficiency, the reforms were intended to remedy the unequal eligibility of different groups of 
insured to switch their health funds. The Health Care Structure Act passed in December 1992 
marked a major step in that direction. From 1996 onwards, every insured was to have free 
choice between all open health insurance funds on a yearly basis. Up to 2001, switching funds 
was possible on an annual basis at the end of each calendar year, while since 2002 switching 
has been facilitated by  allowing for changes on a monthly basis subject to a two-months 
notice period. However, once a fund is changed, further changes within the following 18 
months are permitted only if the insurance fund increases the contribution rate. 
In order to promote ‘fair’ competition, the Health Care Structure Act subjected funds to ‘open 
enrolment’ (Kontrahierungszwang), which requires them to insure every applicant, and to 
‘community rating’ (Diskriminierungsverbot), which prevents them from charging different 
premia  for  different  risk  types.  In  addition,  95%  of  the  benefits  packages  are  equalised 
between health insurance funds, as determined  by the Social-Code-Book V (Buchner  and 
Wasem, 2003).
6 
In order to prevent the selection of low risks, or ‘cream-skimming’, which is prohibited by 
law, the ‘Risk Equalisation Scheme’ (Risikostrukturausgleich) was implemented in 1994 as 
part of the Health Care Structure Act. It was meant to compensate health funds for a relatively 
adverse  risk  portfolio  by  re-allocating  monetary  funds  between  them  according  to  their 
relative risk structure. The re-allocation is based on the so-called risk adjusters age, gender, 
disability and sickness allowances entitlement. Income is also taken into account as far as this 
                                                            
5 It is a well-documented empirical observation that income and health are positively related (e.g., Ettner, 1996). 
6 Only since 2004 has it been possible for health funds to offer bonus programmes to their insured. Limiting our 
analysis to the period 1990 to 2003 enables us to analyse the effect of increased competition on advertising 
within an otherwise rather stable environment.   5
affects the revenues rather than the costs of the health insurance funds. It is, however, only 
equalised to 92% across funds. The idea here was that different contribution rates should then 
reflect  only  differences  in  cost  efficiency  for  a  standardised  risk  structure  of  the  insured 
(Buchner  and  Wasem,  2003).  The  Risk  Equalisation  Scheme  was  reformed  when  the 
enrolment in disease management programmes was introduced as a further risk adjuster and 
when a risk pool was established in order to better share the financial risks related to high-risk 
individuals.
7 From 2009 onwards, the Risk Equalisation Scheme has also included morbidity 
as  laid  down  in  the  Health  Insurance  Competition  Strengthening  Act  (GKV-
Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz) of 2007.  
 
































































  Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2001, 2009), BKK Bundesverband (2007) 
 
As the new legislation was implemented, the German health insurance market experienced 
some  major  changes.The  number  of  health  insurance  funds  decreased  by  more  than  80% 
between  1991  and  2009,  from  1209  to  202  (Figure  1).  This  concentration  process  was 
accompanied  by  a  tendency  towards  convergence  of  the  major  German  health  funds’ 
contribution rates, albeit upward rather than downward (Figure 2).  
 
                                                            
7 ‘Low-risk’ and ‘high-risk’ here refer to the expected expenditures for each type of individuals under the Risk 
Equalisation Scheme. It is possible that an old person with serious health problems is still more attractive for an 
insurer than a young person with only minor health problems if the costs assumed in the risk scheme are even 
higher for the former, while they are lower for the latter.   6
















































  Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2009) 
Note: From July 2005 onwards, the ‘general contribution rate’ was reduced by 0.9% and a 
‘supplement rate’ of 0.9% on employees only was re-introduced. 
 
Moreover, in the wake of the improved switching possibilities, some of the main funds saw 
the number of their insured change substantially. Between 1996 and 2008 the AOK and EAN 
lost 20% and 10% of their insured, respectively (the bulk of that, 16% and 15 %, respectively, 
between  1996  and  2004)  (Bundesministerium  für  Gesundheit,  2009).  This  reduced  their  
market shares from 43.0% to 34.4% (AOK) and from 35.1% to 31.7% (EAN). While the EAR 
saw  a  slight  increase  in  its  market  share  from  1.9%  to  2.3%,  the  IKK  and  the  BKK 
experienced the largest increase with respect to both the number of their insured and their 
market share: The IKK gained 47% in terms of numbers of insured and 45% in terms of 
market share (from 6.9% to 8.7%) and the BKK was able to boost the number of insured by 
86% and its market share by 85% (from 10.3% to 19.1%). 
Based  on  data  from  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  (GSOEP),  Nuscheler  and  Knaus 
(2005) conclude that among the 25 to 54 year old obligatory and voluntary members, the 
percentage of switchers increased from 6.5% to 10.1% between 1995 and 1999.
8 We find that 
in the subsequent five-year period 2000 to 2004, the switching rate for obligatory members 
remained  relatively  stable,  fluctuating  between  9.0%  and  11.1%.  The  rate  in  Germany 
exceeded  that  in  countries  with  a  comparable  institutional  setting,  such  as  Switzerland, 
                                                            
8 Andersen and Schwarze (1998) and Schwarze and Andersen (2001) come to similar conclusions as the increase 
of switching is concerned, although they find lower switching rates in the range of 4% in 1997 and 5% in 2000. 
These differences might be due to different definitions of the switching variable and different sub-samples used.    7
Belgium, Israel and the Netherlands (Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004). In addition, of course, the 
effect of the threat of switching should not be underestimated.
9  
 
3. Advertising by German health insurance funds 
In  order  to  gain  a  first  insight  into  the  impact  of  the  changes  in  the  competitive  market 
structure on the advertising activities of the health insurance funds, we analyse a new dataset 
of advertisements placed by the main German funds over the period 1990 to 2003, provided 
by Nielsen Media Research (2005), and complement this with data on advertising contents we 
collected from the most advertising-intensive magazine Stern for the period 1992 to 2003. 
 
a) Data on the number and costs of advertisements 
We  have  obtained  the  data  on  the  number  of  advertisements  placed  in  newspapers  and 
magazines by the main German health insurance funds, i.e. the federal associations of the 
AOK and BKK as well as the large individual funds Barmer, TK, and DAK (all belonging to 
the group of substitute funds), along with the data on the costs of these adverts, from Nielsen 
Media Research (2005), a company specialised in the collection of data on advertising.  
Figure 3 shows the number and costs of these advertisements (for some summary statistics, 
please see Appendix I). In total, the five funds placed more than 54,000 advertisements for € 
225mn in all German newspapers and magazines between 1990 and 2003. There was some 
advertising in the early 1990s when some limited competition already existed (cf. Section 2). 
The health funds had probably also known about the forthcoming 1992 law and may have 
begun to increase their advertising efforts before the law was passed formally. The data then 
show a further substantial increase in the total number of advertisements since around the 
time of the passing of the Health Care Structure Act until just before the introduction of free 
choice in 1996. This development suggests that health funds used the period 1992 to 1995 for 
increased advertising as a strategy to defend their market position once insurance-switching 
would be allowed from 1996. The subsequent short decline in advertising up to 1997 may 
indicate a period of ‘wait-and-see’ which the funds used to observe whether their advertising 
efforts would show any success. The change from annual open enrolment to monthly open 
enrolment  in  2002  was  associated  with  another  increase  in  advertising  after  a  somewhat 
reduced activity level since 1996.  
                                                            
9 A number of recent studies has analysed switching among German health insurance funds (see, e.g., Andersen 
and Grabka, 2006, Andersen et al., 2007, Tamm et al., 2007 as well as Nuscheler and Knaus, 2005). As our main 
focus here is, however, on advertising activities of health funds without explicitly considering the switching 
response, we abstract from a more detailed discussion of these studies.    8
The breakdown by health insurance funds conveys further interesting insights. From 1990 to 
1994, the AOK and DAK were by far the most advertising-active health insurance funds. 
With free choice becoming available to all, the BKK funds also began to advertise much more 
actively,  and  since  then  BKK  advertisements  made  up  an  important  part  of  total 
advertisements over the sample period. The DAK also continued its high advertising activities 
whereas the AOK reduced the number of advertisements somewhat. The TK and Barmer 
advertised considerably more since 1995 and 1998, respectively, than before. 
 
Figure 3: Volume of advertisements in newspapers and magazines (1990 to 2003):  































































































































































   Source: Nielsen Media Research (2005) (see Appendix I.1 and I.2) 
   9
How  does  the  development  of  the  health  insurance  funds’  advertising  compare  with  the 
advertising of companies in other sectors of the economy? If the latter were to display the 
same profile across time, then it would be less likely that the developments in the health 
sector were distinct from the rest of the  economy and attributable to the pro-competition 
reforms  introduced  into  this  sector.  Figure  4  shows  the  volume  of  advertisements  in 
newspapers and magazines of all companies in all sectors in Germany compared with the 
volume of the main health insurance funds only. This comparison clearly suggests that the 
development  of  the  health  funds’  advertisement  volumes  was,  at  least  in  part,  driven  by 
factors other than those that were behind the development for the total of all sectors.
10  
Overall we conclude that the introduction of pro-competition reforms into the German health 
insurance market was associated with an increase in advertising of the main health insurance 
funds. In the following, we analyse whether there have been changes also to the contents of 
the advertisements. 
 
Figure 4: Volume of advertisements in newspapers and magazines (1990 to 2003):  
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   Source: Nielsen Media Research (2005) for main public health funds;  
                    Nielsen Media Research (2009) for all companies / sectors 
 
                                                            
10 It also suggests that the profile of the number of advertisements was not due to specific characteristics of 
newspapers and magazines. 
   10
b) Data on the contents of advertisements 
We briefly discuss some data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and findings 
from a recent survey (Braun et al., 2006), which allow us to draw some conclusions about 
which factors are most relevant for individuals’ decisions of whether or not to switch health 
funds. We will then examine to which extent these factors are reflected in the contents of 
Stern’s advertisements. 
 
b1) Survey information about switching intentions  
Participants  in  the  GSOEP  from  1997  were  asked  about  the  motives  which  guided  their 
switching decisions, i.e. whether they had switched to a different health insurance fund in the 
past  year  and  whether  they  intended  to  switch  in  the  future.  Even  though  these  detailed 
questions were only included in the survey of 1997, they are still interesting for our purposes 
as they provide some suggestive evidence of the very early impact of the reforms.  
For the individuals who changed their health insurance fund in 1996, the contribution rate was 
the most important motive, featuring in 42% of the responses, followed by the benefits and 
services offered (21% and 16%, respectively). The image of the fund affected the choice of 
15% of respondents. The criteria that would be most relevant for a further switch were again 
the contribution rate (69%), followed by benefits (54%) and services (31%). The image of the 
fund would be important for only 7%.  
For advertising purposes, the reasons why individuals do not intend to switch also are of 
interest, not least because non-switchers present by far the majority of the insured. 77% of 
respondents were generally satisfied with their present fund. More relevant in the context of 
our analysis, 15% of respondents found that the differences between the various funds were 
not explicit enough to warrant switching.  
A more recent survey helps to gain further insights into possible barriers to switching which 
are relevant almost ten years after the introduction of free choice of fund (Braun et al., 2006). 
Once again, it turns out that most insured were satisfied with their health fund. In addition, the 
insured very often underestimated the saving potential of switching to a cheaper fund and 
wrongly  assumed  important  legal  drawbacks  as  a  consequence  of  switching.  23%  of  the 
respondents did not see any difference between the various health insurance funds. For 64%, 
however, funds appeared to differ with respect to the general ‘goodwill’, while 45% perceived 
differences in the contribution rates and 36% in the benefits and services offered.  
Hence  the  contribution  rate  as  well  as  the  benefits  and  services  offered  seem  to  be  an 
important criterion for switchers and non-switchers alike. This could be seen as suggesting   11
that advertisements which tend to focus on fund-specific information are likely to receive 
relatively more attention by potential switchers. The observation that about every fifth person 
does not see any significant difference between the health funds could encourage funds (even 
further) to stress specific characteristics, as perceived differences and the intention to switch 
health funds are positively correlated (Braun et al., 2006). Another way of achieving such a 
differentiation, not strictly related to fact-based information, could be to create a fund-specific 
image. Even though the image does not seem to be very essential for individuals who are 
considering a future switch, 15% of those who did change their fund in 1996 retrospectively 
admitted that the image had played a role in their decision. A careful analysis of the contents 
is thus required to  evaluate whether  funds seem to choose strategies  as suggested by the 
observations here.  
 
b2) Contents of the advertisements in Stern 
In  our  analysis  of  the  contents  of  health  funds’  advertisements,  we  focus  on  the 
advertisements placed in the weekly magazine Stern. As Table 1 shows, Stern attracted most 
advertisements by health funds over the sample period, leading by a substantial margin when 
compared with the weekly magazines Spiegel and Focus, which like Stern focus on political 
and economic events, and when compared with the weekly tabloid Bild am Sonntag (Bams). 
 
Table 1: Top 5 popular magazines by number of advertisements by health funds  
(1990 to 2003) 
  Magazine  Numbers 
1  Stern  380 
2  Bams   297 
3  Spiegel  279 
4  Focus  250 
5  Super Illu  162 
Source: Nielsen Media Research (2005) 
 
There are a number of possible reasons why Stern should be an attractive advertising outlet 
for health insurance funds. Stern is among the most commonly read magazines in Germany 
with an average 1,225,000 copies in the fourth quarter of 2009 (IVW, 2010). Even more 
important  may  be  the  profile  of  its  readers:  Of  all  readers  with  an  upper  secondary  or 
university  degree  as  the  highest  degree  obtained,  the  magazine  reaches  11.6%  or  17.1%,   12
respectively, as Table 2 shows. The readers comprise more than 40% of those with a monthly 
net income of above €1500 and a smaller but still relevant share of those with a net income of 
€1250 to1500. Furthermore, the share of readers between 30 and 59 years of age amounts to 
between 17.9% and 21.8% and is slightly higher than for the younger or older age groups.  
While the readership is thus not representative for the insured population, it can be argued that 
it is most interesting for health insurance funds. Among the three groups of characteristics 
provided in Table 2, education, income and age, the relatively high educational level of Stern 
readers  makes  this  magazine  particular  attractive:  Education  is  likely  to  be  positively 
correlated with health status and in contrast to age and income it is not part of the Risk 
Equalisation Scheme (see Section 2).  
 
Table 2: Structure of readers  
  Stern 
Upper secondary degree (no university degree)  11.6% (3) 
University degree  17.1% (4) 
Indiv. net income between €1250 and €1500  14.0% (5) 
Indiv. net income ≥ € 1500   41.8% (3) 
Age group 20 to 29   13.2% (6) 
Age group 30 to 39  17.9% (6) 
Age group 40 to 49  21.8% (4) 
Age group 50 to 59  17.2% (5) 
Age group 60 to 69  14.1% (6) 
 Source: Burda Advertising Center – Presse I (2008)  
 (In parenthesis: ranking for the respective characteristics among all 176  
German magazines)  
 
Out of the 347 advertisements by the main German health insurance funds placed in Stern, 
which are in the dataset from Nielsen Media Research, we have identified 323 (93%), so that 
our sample appears to be fairly representative of the population of all Stern advertisements 
(see Appendix II.5 for more details).
11 These manually collected advertisements provide a 
unique opportunity to analyse any potential change of advertising strategies in response to the 
changed  institutional  environment,  which  cannot  be  captured  by  a  mere  look  at  the 
quantitative data.  
                                                            
11 We can only speculate why we did not manage to find the remaining 24 advertisements. One reason might be 
that they are of rather small size.    13
We label advertisements as ‘general’ when they mainly feature topics of general relevance for 
a healthy living but do not tend to allow for some differentiation between health funds, e.g., 
food/diet, sports and related issues. We label advertisements as ‘fund-specific’ when they 
communicate,  or  at  least  allude  to,  specific  characteristics  of  the  health  funds  such  as 
contribution rates, costs and benefits or programmes for chronically ill and thus do allow for 
some  differentiation.  Figures  5  and  6  display  the  number  of  general  and  fund-specific 
advertisements, respectively. 
 
Figure 5: Numbers of ‘general’ advertisements in Stern:  
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  Source: Own data (see Appendix II.1 and II.5) 
 
Figure 6: Numbers of ‘fund-specific advertisements in Stern: 







































































Total  number of ads 
in Stern (right axis)
Number Number
 
   Source: Own data (see the Appendix II.2 and II.5)   14
The data show that the number of general advertisements was higher before the introduction 
of  the  various  reforms  whereas  the  number  of  fund-specific  advertisements  was  higher 
afterwards. As to the funds which were most active we find that general advertisements were 
mainly  placed  by  the  AOK  and  DAK,  and  fund-specific  contents  were  prevalent  in  the 
advertisements by the BKK, Barmer and TK as well as again the DAK. So, the DAK seems to 
have maintained its high activity level over the whole period studied while at the same time 
adjusting the content to the changed institutional environment in contrast to the other funds.  
Figure 7 presents the share of the advertisements of each category in the total. We use two 
different measures to determine fund-specific advertisements, the one shown in Figure 6 and 
one  that  also  includes  advertisements  which  mention  the  size  of  the  health  funds,  as 
information  about  the  size  might  signal  some  unobserved  characteristics,  e.g.,  customer 
satisfaction.
12 This graphical representation highlights very clearly the shift in the relative 
importance of the two types of advertisements.  
 
Figure 7: ‘General’ and ‘fund-specific’ advertisements as a share of all advertisements by the  


























































Legend:  Solid  grey  line:  advertisements  which  contain  at  least  one  of  the 
following: contribution rates, costs and benefits or programmes for chronically ill. 
Dashed grey line: advertisements which in addition contain the size of the fund. 
Source: Own data (see Appendix II.4) 
 
 
Summarising, our data on the contents of the Stern advertisements suggest that the share of 
fund-specific advertisements has substantially increased, a process that started at about the 
                                                            
12 As the size was largely determined by the institutional restrictions before 1996, the informational value is, 
however, limited.   15
same time when competitive measures were introduced into the German health insurance 
market, in contrast to general advertisements. Comparison with survey data suggests that the 
contents  have  changed  towards  the  factors  that  matter  most  in  individuals’  decisions  of 
whether or not to switch health funds. 
 
4. Risk selection, advertising and competition of health insurance funds 
We are now in a position to discuss the results of our analysis in the light of the intended 
outcome  of  the  pro-competitive  legislation.  We  are  in  particular  interested  in  analysing 
whether competition among health insurance funds works as intended. Does it lead to more 
cost-efficiency, or do funds try to attract good risks, i.e. do they engage in risk selection?
13   
It is useful to consider the objective function of health insurance funds when they are subject 
to regulation such as in the German health market. We conjecture here that the objective of 
health funds, being non-profit organisations, is to increase their size in terms of the number of 
insured,  as  one  strategy  to  remain  in  the  market.
14  According  to  a  survey  of  health  fund 
managers,  guaranteeing  the  continuity  of  the  fund  ranks  first  on  their  agenda  (Haenecke, 
2001). Besides, it is common practice that the contracts with the fund management contain 
clauses according to which bonuses are related to the growth of the fund (Höppner et al., 
2006) while growth itself is linked to an increase in the reputation of the management.  
From the discussion of the institutional framework of the German health market in Section 2, 
we know that benefits are largely determined by law and therefore largely equal across funds. 
It is often claimed that competition then takes place in terms of the price, i.e. the contribution 
rate, rather than in terms of the quality of service (Lauterbach and Wille, 2001; Greß, 2002).
 15 
A lower price implies a competitive advantage. With perfect risk compensation, a fund would 
be the cheaper the more efficiently it operated. With imperfect risk compensation, the risk 
                                                            
13 A related aspect is the question whether health funds, which resort to indirect risk selection, are successful, i.e. 
whether via their advertising strategy they manage to affect the switching behaviour and through this the risk 
structure of their insured. See Becker and Uebelmesser (2010) for an econometric analysis of this question, and 
Becker,  Hole  and  Uebelmesser  (2010)  for  an  analysis  of  the  heterogeneity  of  households’  preferences  for 
individual health funds. 
14 Hart (1983) considers the case of firms run by so-called ‘satisficing’ managers who do not value profits per se 
but gain private benefits from keeping their job by maintaining the firm afloat. This may hold for managers of a 
non-profit organisation such as the German health insurance funds. In the model by Hart (1983), an increase in 
competition may then induce otherwise reluctant managers to increase their efforts to reduce costs in order to 
avoid bankruptcy. Cost reduction via increases in efficiency would be one way for health funds to reduce their 
contribution rate to attract new members, cost reduction via a lower risk portfolio would be an additional or an 
alternative way, and possibly a less costly one in terms of effort involved. 
15 For empirical analyses that show that the contribution rate is a significant factor of an individual’s probability 
to switch their fund, see for example Andersen and Schwarze (1998), Schwarze and Andersen (2001), as well as 
Nuscheler and Knaus (2005) for Germany and Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) as well as Strombom et. al. 
(2002) for analyses for the US.   16
structure of the insured becomes important. It is then well possible that funds benefit from 
successful risk selection and a favourable risk structure. 
Was  there  any  incentive  in  the  German  health  care  market  for  health  insurance  funds  to 
engage in risk selection for the period under consideration? As has been shown by different 
studies for Germany (Breyer and Kifmann, 2001; Jacobs et al., 2002; Lauterbach and Wille, 
2001), the number of risk adjusters under the current Risk Equalisation Scheme was far from 
sufficient to adequately reflect individual risks. For example, as discussed in relation to the 
characteristics of the Stern readers in Section 3, the educational level was not part of the Risk 
Equalisation  Scheme  even  though  education  is  likely  to  be  positively  correlated  with  the 
health status. Buchner and Wasem (2003) also demonstrate that risk compensation was less 
than perfect: Low-cost health funds with a less than 100% ratio of actual to standardised 
expenditures have grown fast in recent years, while funds with a ratio above 100% have lost 
members. Together with open enrolment, these shortcomings of the risk scheme have created 
incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection so as to either achieve or maintain a low risk 
profile.
16,17 
There is so far only anecdotal evidence that health funds engage in risk selection (e.g., Van de 
Ven et al., 2003; Buchner and Wasem, 2003). Glazer and McGuire (2006) conclude that it is 
not possible to evaluate the significance of the problem as there is no reported evidence on its 
prevalence. Nuscheler and Knaus (2005) indirectly test for risk selection of BKK funds. They 
do not find evidence for risk selection of BKKs when by comparing the health characteristics 
of individuals who switch to a BKK to the characteristics of those who switch to a non-
BKK.
18  While  the  authors  analyse  the  possible  outcome  or  output  of  (successful)  risk 
selection, we in this paper have the data to focus on a potential instrument of, or input to, risk 
selection, namely advertising. 
How can these reflections about potential risk selection incentives be related to our analysis of 
the advertising activities of health insurance funds? For this, we resort to our content analysis.  
We consider first advertisements which focus on ‘general’ topics loosely related to health 
issues. By placing advertisements of this type, the funds might aim at providing incentives for 
the insured to improve their health status and thus lower the funds’ health expenditures while 
                                                            
16 See Höppner et al. (2006) for an overview of possible risk selection strategies and Van de Ven and Ellis 
(2000) for a discussion of several welfare-decreasing effects of risk selection.   
17  Observing  that  mainly  the  young  and  healthy  switch  funds  is,  of  course,  not  proof  of  risk  selection  as 
switching costs might be lower for them (see Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Nuscheler and Knaus, 2005). 
18 The analysis is based on the assumptions that non-BKKs do not engage in risk selection and can thus be taken 
as a benchmark, and that BKKs and non-BKKs are sufficiently homogeneous otherwise.   17
at the same time accepting that an advertisement of general content may also have positive 
spill-over  effects  on  members  of  rival  funds.  One  might,  therefore,  expect  that  general 
advertisements due to their public-goods character are mainly placed by large health funds 
and  that  the  number  of  these  advertisements  falls  when  competition  is  introduced,  if 
competition  is  assumed  to  reduce  the  size  of  individual  funds.
19  This  is  indeed  what  we 
observe (cf. Figure 5).  
In  contrast  to  general  advertisements,  the  number  of  fund-specific  advertisements  has 
increased since 1994/1995 (cf. Figure 6). The change in the relative importance of both types 
of advertisements as shown in Figure 7 can result from two different strategies. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  traditional  theory  of  advertising  postulates  that  advertisements 
communicate objectively useful information (Stigler, 1961 and in particular Nelson, 1970, 
1974) which consumers use to rationally update their beliefs before making their choices. As 
individuals need information about the main characteristics of the health funds to be able to 
make a well-founded switching decision, one would expect that more competition would lead 
to  an  increase  of  the  number  of  advertisements  which  convey  ‘fundamental’  information 
about  fund-specific  facts,  such  as  the  contribution  rate  of  a  health  fund,  as  the  rational 
consumer’s demand for this type of information should increase. If advertisements indeed 
contained this information, this would indicate that competition works as intended. It pays for 
the funds to compete along the lines stipulated by law in contrast to pursuing risk selection 
activities.  
On the other hand, an increase of fund-specific advertisements might also follow from an 
incentive  of  the  health  insurance  funds  to  create  a  subjective  image,  which  can  help  in 
competing  for  the  insured  in  two  ways  (Bagwell,  2008):  First,  it  would  allow  funds  to 
artificially  differentiate  themselves  from  competitors  despite  the  a-priori  homogeneity 
imposed on the funds by law, which might justify a mark-up on contribution rates ceteris 
paribus relative to competitors. Second, an image that would be appealing particularly to good 
risks could then enable the fund to reduce its contribution rate, thus becoming even more 
attractive  to  consumers.  If  funds  followed  this  behavioural  strategy,  the  introduction  of 
competition should, similarly to the traditional theory, increase the number of fund-specific 
advertisements.
20 Competition would then, however, be associated with more risk selection.  
 
                                                            
19 This line of reasoning could provide another reason why  the funds  advertised already before the passing of 
the Health Care Structure Act (cf. Figure 3). 
20 Of course, also ‘general’ advertisements might be placed in order to create an image. But as this type of 
advertisement is no longer very important, we abstract here from further discussing it.   18
Figure 8: Advertisements mentioning costs and contribution rates:  


























































  Source: Own data (see Appendix II.3) 
  Note: There was only one advert in 1997 mentioning costs and contributions. 
 
Hence the conclusions regarding potential risk selection and therefore regarding one effect of 
the introduced competition, will differ substantially depending on which advertising strategy 
the funds have been following. Identification of the strategy requires a careful analysis of the 
informational contents of the advertisements, and our data enable us to do this: 
We focus here on the subgroup of fund-specific advertisements which  mention costs and 
contributions (ignoring those mentioning benefits and services) as they should best allow a 
distinction between informative and non-informative contents. Only if advertisements refer to 
costs or contribution rates by giving precise information (e.g., total expenditure, expenditure 
per  insured,  contribution  rate)  are  they  labelled  ‘informative’.  When  they  only  generally 
mention costs or contribution rates, they are labelled as ‘non-informative’. Figure 8 provides 
some details about the development of both types of advertisements. 
The  data  suggest,  therefore,  that  health  funds  may  not  primarily  use  advertising  to 
communicate useful fact-based information.
21 Rather, there is some evidence that advertising 
may be one instrument which funds employ to try to attract good risks. This would, of course, 
be at odds with the intended effect of the pro-competitive legislation. 
 
                                                            
21 Except for the size of the funds the advertisements hardly contain any detailed information. But as we have 
argued above the size is to a large extent determined by the institutional restrictions of the past and thus less of 
an indicator of the present quality of a fund.   19
5. Conclusions 
We analyse the associations between the pro-competition measures recently introduced into 
the German health sector and the advertising activities of the major health insurance funds. 
We use two new datasets in this paper, one of the volume and costs of all advertisements 
placed by the main German health insurance funds in all German newspapers and magazines, 
and one of the advertisements placed in the most advertising-intensive magazine Stern.  
Our results suggest that competition has gone hand-in-hand with an increase in advertising. 
Although the amount of fund-specific information in advertisements has increased, we have 
seen that even these advertisements are still relatively little informative. In line with this, a 
substantial number of survey respondents who did not even consider switching said that they 
did not see any significant differences between the various funds. This suggests that it may be 
important  for  health  funds  to  create  an  insurance-specific  image,  with  which  to  generate 
spurious  differentiation  and  increase  consumers’  perception  of  the  fund.  This  would  then 
further  increase  the  evidence  in  favour  of  the  behavioural  model  of  advertising  and  run 
contrary to the goals of the pro-competition reforms. In future research it would be interesting 
to see how far our tentative results for Germany may be applied to other countries with a 
similar institutional setting.   20
References 
Andersen, Hanfried H. and Johannes Schwarze (1998): „GKW‚ 97: Kommt Bewegung in die 
Landschaft?  Eine  empirische  Analyse  der  Kassenwahlentscheidung“,  Arbeit  und 
Sozialpolitik 9/10, 11-23. 
Andersen, Hanfried H. and Markus M. Grabka (2006): „Kassenwechsel in der GKV 1997 – 
2004: Profile – Trends – Perspektive“, in: Dirk Göpffarth, Stefan Greß, Klaus Jacobs, 
Jürgen Wasem (Hrsg.): Jahrbuch Risikostrukturausgleich 2006, Asgard-Verlag: Sankt 
Augustin, 145-189. 
Andersen, Hanfried H., Markus M. Grabka and Johannes Schwarze (2007): „Premium rates, 
competition  among  health  insurance  funds  and  the  health  care  reform  2007“, 
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 227, 429-450. 
Avery, Rosemary J., Donald Kenkel, Dean R. Lillar, Alan Mathios and Hua Wang (2008): 
“Health disparities and direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical products”, 
in: Lorens Helmchen, Robert Kaestner, Anthony Lo Sasso (eds.): Advances in Health 
Economics and Health Services Research 19, 71-94.  
Bagwell,  Kyle  (2008):  „The  economic  analysis  of  advertising”,  in:  Mark  Armstrong  und 
Robert Porter (Hrgs.): Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, Elsevier B.V.: 
Amsterdam, 1701-1844. 
Becker, Bettina and Silke Uebelmesser (2010): “The impact of print media advertising on 
public health insurance switching”, mimeo, Loughborough University and University 
of Munich. 
Becker,  Bettina,  Arne  Hole  and  Silke  Uebelmesser  (2010):  “Heterogeneity  of  household 
preferences  for  health  insurance  companies”,  mimeo,  Loughborough  University, 
University of Sheffield and University of Munich. 
BKK Bundesverband (2007): Entwicklung der Anzahl der Krankenkassen in der GKV, Berlin. 
Braun  Bernhard,  Stefan  Greß,  Karin  Höppner,  Gerd  Marstedt,  Heinz  Rothgang,  Marcus 
Tamm, Jürgen Wasem (2006): „Barrieren für einen Wechsel der Krankenkasse: Loya-
lität, Bequemlichkeit, Informationsdefizite?“, in: Jan Böcken, Bernhard Braun, Robert 
Amhof,  Melanie  Schnee  (Hrsg.):  Gesundheitsmonitor  2006,  Verlag  Bertelsmann 
Stiftung: Gütersloh, 11-31. 
Breyer,  Friedrich  und  Mathias  Kifmann  (2001):  “Optionen  der  Weiterentwicklung  des 
Risikostrukturausgleichs in der GKV“, DIW Diskussionspapier Nr. 236, Berlin. 
Buchner,  Florian  and  Jürgen  Wasem  (2003):  „Needs  for  further  improvement:  Risk 
adjustment in the German health insurance system“, Health Policy 65, 21-35.   21
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2001): Daten des Gesundheitswesens 2001, Bonn. 
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2009): Daten des Gesundheitswesens 2009, Berlin. 
Burda  Advertising  Center  GmbH  (2008):  Reichweitenanalyse  (ma 2008) Pressemedien I, 
http://ma.bik-gmbh.de/burda/ (20 August 2008). 
Busse Reinhard and Annette Riesberg (2004): Health care systems in transition: Germany, 
WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies: Copenhagen. 
Cronqvist,  Henrik  (2005):  “Advertising  and  portfolio  choice”,  Working  Paper  CeRP  N° 
44/05, Moncalieri. 
Cutler, David M. and Richard J. Zeckhauser (2000): “The Anatomy of health insurance”, in: 
Anthony J. Culyer and Joseph P. Newhouse (eds.): Handbook of Health Economics 
1A, Elsevier: Amsterdam, 563-643. 
Ettner, Susan  L. (1996): “New evidence on the relationship between income and health”, 
Journal of Health Economics 15, 67-85. 
Glazer,  Jacob  and  Thomas  G.  McGuire  (2006):  “Contending  with  risk  selection  in 
competitive health insurance markets”, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitk 7, 75-91. 
Greß, Stefan, Peter Groenwegen, Jan Kerssens, Bernhard Braun and Jürgen Wasem (2002): 
“Free choice of sickness funds in regulated competition: Evidence from Germany and 
The Netherlands”, Health Policy 60, 235-254. 
Greß,  Stefan  (2002):  “Freie  Kassenwahl  und  Preiswettbewerb  in  der  GKV  –  Effekte  und 
Perspektiven”, Vierteljahresheft zur Wirtschaftsforschung 71, 490-497. 
Hart,  Oliver  (1983):  “The  market  mechanism  as  an  incentive  scheme“,  Bell  Journal  of 
Economics, 14, 366-382. 
Haenecke,  Henrik  (2001):  „Unternehmensziele  von  Krankenkassen  –  Eine  empirische 
Analyse“, Arbeit und Sozialpolitik 1-2, 27-34. 
Höppner, Karin, Stefan Greß, Heinz Rothgang and Jürgen Wasem (2006): „Instrumente der 
Risikoselektion  –  Theorie  und  Empirie“,  in:  Dirk  Göpffarth,  Stefan  Greß,  Klaus 
Jacobs, Jürgen Wasem (eds.): Jahrbuch Risikostrukturausgleich 2006, Asgard-Verlag: 
Sankt Augustin, 119-144. 
IVW (2010): Auflagenzahlen Print, http://www.ivw.de/index.html (1 March 2010) 
Jacobs, Klaus, Peter Reschke, Dieter Cassel and Jürgen Wasem (2002): Zur  Wirkung des 
Risikostrukturausgleichs  in  der  gesetzlichen  Krankenversicherung  –  Eine  Untersu-
chung im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Gesundheit: Endbericht, Schriftenreihe 
des Bundesministeriums für Gesundheit, Bd. 140, Nomos: Baden-Baden.   22
Jain, Prem and Johanna Shuang Wu (2000), “Truth in mutual fund advertising: Evidence on 
future performance and fund flows,” Journal of Finance 55, 937-958.  
Lauterbach, Karl W. and Eberhard Wille (2001): Modell eines fairen Wettbewerbs durch den 
Risikostrukturausgleich.  Sofortprogramm  “Wechselkomponente  und  solidarische 
Rückversicherung” unter Berücksichtigung der Morbidität (Abschlussbericht). 
Laske-Aldershof, Trea, Frederik Schut, Konstantin Beck, Stefan Greß, Amir Shmueli and Ca-
rine Van de Voorde (2004): “Consumer mobility in social health insurance markets: A 
five-country comparison”, Applied Health Economics and Health Policy 3, 229-241. 
Mullainathan, Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer (2005): “Persuasion in finance”, mimeo, Harvard 
University. 
Nelson, Phillip (1970): “Information and consumer behavior”, Journal of Political Economy 
78, 311-329. 
Nelson, Phillip (1974): “Advertising as information”, Journal of Political Economy 82, 729-
754. 
Nielsen Media Research (2005): “Data on ads placed by AOK, Barmer, BKK, DAK, TK in 
newspapers and magazines”, Nielsen Median Research GmbH (acquired by purchase). 
Nielsen  Media  Research  (2009):  “Data  on  the  development  of  gross  advertisement 
expenditures  1990-2008”  (Brutto-Werbemarkt),  http://www.ip-deutschland.de/ipd/ 
forschung_und_service/mediaforschung/werbemarktdaten/entwicklung_des_werbemar
ktes.cfm (25 February 2010). 
Nuscheler, Robert and Thomas Knaus (2005): “Risk selection in the German public health 
insurance system”, Health Economics 14, 1253-1271. 
Scherer,  Frederic  .M.  (2000):  “The  pharmaceutical  industry”,  in:  Anthony  J.  Culyer  and 
Joseph  P.  Newhouse  (eds.):  Handbook  of  Health  Economics,  vol.  1A,  Elsevier: 
Amsterdam, 1297-1336. 
Schwarze, Johannes and Hanfried H. Andersen (2001): „Kassenwechsel in der Gesetzlichen 
Krankenversicherung: Welche Rolle spielt der Beitragssatz?“, DIW Diskussionspapier 
267, Berlin. 
Schweitzer,  Stuart  O.  (2007):  Pharmaceutical  Economics  and  Policy,  Oxford  University 
Press: New York. 
Stern (1992-2003): Weekly magazine, Gruner + Jahr. 
Stigler, George (1961): „The economics of information“, Journal of Political Economy 69, 
213-225. 
Stigler, George (1987): The Theory of Price, MacMillan Publishing: New York.   23
Strombom,  Bruce  A.,  Buchmueller,  Thomas  C.  and  Paul  J.  Feldstein  (2002):  „Switching 
costs, price sensitivity and health plan choice“, Journal of Health Economics 21, 89-
116. 
Tamm,  Marcus,  Harald  Tauchmann,  Jürgen  Wasem  and  Stefan  Greß  (2007):  “Price 
elasticities and social health insurance choice in Germany - A dynamic panel data 
approach”, Health Economics 16, 243-256. 
Van  de  Ven,  Wynand  P.M.M.,  Konstantin  Beck,  Florian  Buchner,  Dov  Chernichovsky, 
Lucien Gardiol, Alberto Holly,  Leida M.  Lamers, Erik Schokkaert, Amir Shmueli, 
Stephan Spycher, Carine Van de Voorde, René C.J.A. van Vliet, Jürgen Wasem, Irith 
Zmora (2003): „Risk adjustment and risk selection on the sickness fund insurance 
market in five European countries“, Health Policy 65, 75-98. 
Van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M. and Randall P. Ellis (2000): “Risk adjustment in competitive 
health plan markets”, in: Anthony J. Culyer and Joseph P. Newhouse (eds.): Handbook 
of Health Economics, vol. 1A, Elsevier: Amsterdam, 755-845. 
Van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M. and René C. J. A. van Vliet (1992): “How can we prevent 
cream skimming in a competitive health insurance market?”, in: Peter Zweifel und H. 
E. Frech III (eds.): Health Economics Worldwide. Dodrecht, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, 23-46.   24
Appendix 
 
I) Data on number and costs of advertisements 
 
1) Number of ads 
 
Funds  Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
AOK  14  2532.50  641.86  1591  3649 
Barmer  14  143.00  105.44  7  307 
BKK  14  414.50  269.14  43  956 
DAK  14  515.29  506.45  9  1631 
TK  14  258.79  248.87  32  935 
           
           
Year  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
1990  5  343.8  697.658  8  1591 
1991  5  389.4  799.5382  7  1819 
1992  5  620.8  1220.753  31  2803 
1993  5  745.2  1294.031  34  3046 
1994  5  953.6  1527.374  49  3649 
1995  5  1193.8  1407.854  154  3606 
1996  5  1128.2  1204.562  253  3028 
1997  5  665.4  702.2196  134  1889 
1998  5  741  739.2966  213  1956 
1999  5  700.2  847.0999  166  2194 
2000  5  1056.2  917.2163  242  2561 
2001  5  687  1005.476  92  2458 
2002  5  895  1025.134  39  2639 
2003  5  699.8  859.9629  170  2216 
   25
2) Costs of ads (in Euro) 
 
Funds  Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
AOK  14  6711.071  1399.684  4891  10217 
Barmer  14  1155.286  1506.149  9  3771 
BKK  14  2426  1945.097  158  6843 
DAK  14  4315  3475.109  4  10466 
TK  14  1441.357  1059.634  168  3097 
           
           
Year  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
1990  5  1260.6  2576.251  4  5865 
1991  5  1301.8  2716.934  9  6160 
1992  5  2593  3717.939  29  8602 
1993  5  2970.4  3747.912  33  7238 
1994  5  3868  4925.734  200  10217 
1995  5  4962.4  4187.312  303  10466 
1996  5  4092.2  3736.593  308  9590 
1997  5  2459.4  2450.136  160  6183 
1998  5  3425  1609.975  2279  6226 
1999  5  3629.6  2144.263  1673  7307 
2000  5  4320.6  2094.542  1768  7586 
2001  5  2563.2  1606.917  979  5196 
2002  5  3779.8  2556.808  112  6471 
2003  5  3710.4  818.2477  2582  4891 
 
Source: Nielsen Media Research (2005)   26
II) Data on the contents of advertisements 
1) Number of ads with general content (food, fitness and other)         
    Year                         
    1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Total 
Funds  AOK  11  11  7                2  1  32 
  Barmer              2    2      6  10 
  BKK        3                  3 
  DAK  10  11  11  8  1                41 
  TK                        4  4 
  Total  21  22  18  11  1     2     2     2  11  90 
                             
                             
2) Number of ads with fund-specific content (benefits, services, costs, contribution rates)   
    Year                          
    1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Total 
Funds  AOK      4      4  3  3          14 
  Barmer              5  8  7  3    12  35 
  BKK        8  6  1  9  10  6  10  13  9  72 
  DAK  2  2  1    14    6  7  3  2  15  19  71 
  TK              2      3  8  8  21 
  Total  2  2  5  8  20  5  25  28  16  18  36  48  213 
         
         
3) Ads with fund-specific content (only costs, contribution rates = CC) 
    – differentiated acc. to content (non-informative vs. informative)              
    Year                          
    1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Total 
CC ads (non-info)  
in % of total CC ads           
0  83  100  78  60  60  60   
CC ads (info)        
 in % of total CC ads                100  17  0  22  40  40  40   
Total CC ads  0  0  0  0  0  1  12  15  9  10  5  15  67 
                             
                             
4) General and fund-specific ads in % of total number of ads (per year)     
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Total 
General content  100  100  78  42  4  0  7  0  8  0  4  22    
Fund-specific content  10  9  22  31  77  100  86  97  64  86  77  98    
Fund-specific content 
incl. size of the fund 
10  9  22  69  81  100  86  97  72  95  81  98 
  
                             
                             
5) Total number collected versus total number acc. to Nielsen data           
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Total 
Total number  
(manually collected 
ads) 
21  22  23  26  26  5  29  29  25  21  47  49  323 
Total number  
(Nielsen data)  27  24  24  29  29  6  30  30  28  18  51  51  347 
Collected ads in % of 
ads from Nielsen   78  92  96  90  90  83  97  97  89  117  92  96  93 
 
Source: Manually collected advertisements placed in Stern  
 